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Supreme Court Guidelines on Ndps Act

“(1) At the hearing of offences under this Act, the court shall decide whether the accused should be convicted, acquitted or released, whether an object seized under this Act or an object seized under section 60, section 61 or section 62 may be forfeited and, if the court decides that the property is so liable, it may order confiscation accordingly. This right has been granted to control frivolous cases, since the NDPS law is an irreconcilable law and if the circumstances allow it and the magistrate or official considers that there is no legitimate case against the accused, he can be released immediately, because according to the NDPS law, if a person is reserved for an average or commercial quantity, Pre-trial detention for such an alleged crime is extreme Taxation and, in addition, obtaining bail is a problematic issue when it comes to the full satisfaction of the court under section 37 [11] of the NDPS Act, a provision that must be met to obtain commercial bail and when it complies with sections 19 [12], 24-A [13] and 27 [14] of the Act. Tripura Supreme Court: The Single-Judge Bank of S.G. Chattopadhyay, J. clarified that if a vehicle is seized under the Narcotics and Psychotropics Act 1985 (NDPS Act), in the event that no owner comes forward within 30 days to claim ownership of the vehicle, the court may make an order ordering the Committee on the Elimination of Drugs to dispose of the vehicle by sale. This does not prevent the owner from going to court after 30 days and filing an application for release of the vehicle. The Supreme Court noted that the term “reasonable grounds” used in paragraph 37(1)(b) of the HNS Act would imply credible and plausible grounds for the court to believe that the accused is not guilty of the alleged crime. The court also stated that under section 37 of the NDPS Act, bail cannot be granted simply because nothing was found in the defendant`s possession. That. Moreover, in the Nikesh Tarachand Shah case,16 the Supreme Court,16 when considering the issue of the fundamental rights to life and personal liberty, held that fundamental rights, in particular article 21 of the Constitution, were simply inviolable and that constitutional courts would come to the aid of a person who could prove the violation of these sacrosanct rights. The present case, Nabi Alam v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi),[1] was referred by Single Judge Suresh Kumar Kaith to the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court to resolve an issue arising out of two conflicting judgments concerning the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985[2] (hereinafter referred to as the “NDPS Act”).

of the same court with regard to the “mandatory presence of a magistrate or public official during the process of search and seizure of illicit substances”. The Gujarat State Legal Counsel also argued that, since the defendant had not contested the fact that the “charas” had been found in the vehicle, it was irrelevant that the information had not been recorded at first instance by the police officer. The court did not accept this allegation because it concluded that the failure to record information effectively deprived the defendant and the court of the evidence to determine what exact information PW 2 had received before stopping the vehicle. He also noted that the value of this information, which was at the earliest stage in determining the extent of the accused`s involvement in the crime, was of great value. It was not enough for PW 2, during his interrogation after a long period in court, to remember the information he had received before going to the scene of the crime. In other respects too, it was considered that the information referred to by PW 2 itself tended to exonerate rather than incriminate the complainant. Finally, the court held that the failure to record vital information collected by the police at first instance could be considered a circumstance in favour of the accused. After analysing these and other elements, the court finally allowed the defendant/appellant`s appeal, set aside the conviction and the High Court`s judgment against him and reinstated the trial court`s acquittal in his favour.

The relationship in Abdul Rashid (op. O.) is that the failure to record important information gathered by the police at first instance may be regarded as a circumstance in favour of the accused. The police officer interviewed as a decisive witness, PW2, admitted in this case that he had only been there after 10 years. We have carefully examined the minutes in the light of the above allegations that the investigator resented the complainant for the road accident of 26.7.1997. A review of the apology document, published as ex. DB., shows that it bears the signatures of various persons, including Gurdial Singh (DW 3) and Harjap Singh (DW 5), but the signature of Jarnail Singh (PW 5), the investigator in charge of the case, did not appear in the said document. PW 5 was also thoroughly investigated and cross-examined, but no questions were asked about the execution of the above apology document. It was not implied to him that that document had been executed in his presence and that he was also an affirmative party to that apology document. Accordingly, both the General Court and the High Court were entitled to express doubts as to the authenticity of that defence.

A document can always be created incorrectly by obtaining the signatures of a few people, but said document, when presented as evidence, must be able to pass the authenticity test. In our view, the said document is a questionable document and its authenticity could not be proved by the complainant, since he had not informed PW 5 during his cross-examination that it had been carried out in his presence and with his consent.